

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

4 December 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 4 December 1969

ADD/I noted that the latest Task Force LOOKOUT report mentions the presence of truck-mounted, sixteen-tube, 140 mm. rocket launchers in North Vietnam just north of the DMZ.

ADD/I requested guidance for responding to a question from Russ Blandford regarding what help the U. S. could expect from the Soviets in exerting pressure on the North Vietnamese. The Director instructed that Blandford be told the Agency has seen no evidence of Soviet help with the North Vietnamese.



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Godfrey reported the roundup of opposition political leaders in Sudan. He invited attention to the Annex in today's Vietnam Sitrep.

D/ONE recommended that the Director approve a DIA request that NIE 11-6-67, Soviet Strategy and Intentions in the Mediterranean Basin, be updated. The Director approved.

D/ONE reported on the failure of efforts to reach agreement with NSA and ONI on revision of the naval section of NIE 11-14-69. He recommended that the Director address this problem at today's USIB meeting. D/ONE also warned that the Army and Air Force positions might become unstuck.

Maury reported on efforts to get the Senate to focus on the new CIA retirement legislation.

Maury recommended that COS, Saigon be sent guidance in connection with the visit to Saigon of Messrs. Lowenstein and Moose of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff to examine the pacification program. The Director said that the Chief of Station should be

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urged to take up the problem with Ambassador Colby, who is manager of this program and should bear the main responsibility for briefing the two visitors.

Houston reported that he is ready to discuss the recent New Yorker articles on the Justice Department.

DD/P reported that the "PRU paper" will be ready in ample time for the next 303 Committee Meeting on 16 December.

DDCI, reporting on his 3 December visit to the Naval War College, noted that the students there needed more information on CIA and the intelligence community.



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L. K. White

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ANNEX

THE COMMUNIST NINTH RESOLUTION

1. Communist cadre in South Vietnam evidently are still being indoctrinated on guidelines contained in the ninth Resolution of their Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). Issued in South Vietnam in July 1969 as a follow-up to a resolution adopted by the North Vietnamese politburo in Hanoi last April, Resolution 9 attempts to prepare Communist forces to face contingencies ranging from a fairly early end of major fighting to the possibility of the war's dragging on for years. In this sense it is similar to other Communist directives and resolutions captured over the years.

2. What makes Resolution 9 unique is its suggestion of what may lie ahead for the Communists. It clearly looks toward a change in the character of the struggle for South Vietnam--a change the Communists seem to hope will take place in the next year or so at longest. The "new situation" envisioned in the document is described as a transitional phase in which major hostilities would have ended while the contest for control of the South would continue to be fought largely on the political plane, heavily bolstered by terrorism and subversion. The idea that the present South Vietnamese Government probably would still be intact and in control of much, if not most, of the country comes through strongly and is another major new ingredient in Communist thinking about how future developments might unfold.

3. No clear blueprint for arriving at the "new situation" emerges in the text itself or in the numerous captured notebooks from study sessions propagating the resolution among the party faithful. The resolution does suggest, however, that the new stage will be preceded by further heavy fighting followed either by a full US pullout or by an agreement to withdraw.

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It does not shed any real light on the Communists' specific plans or tactics in their current "winter-spring" campaign, for which it in part set the stage. Moreover, although the resolution seems to anticipate a cease-fire leading to the "new situation," it does not establish the exact context for a change in the war. It by no means rules out possible alternatives in which main-force fighting will be protracted, but it strongly suggests that the Communists hope to avoid this.

4. The principal impression gained from the text of Resolution 9 and the scores of briefings based on it is that the Communists desire an early end to the big-unit war and anticipate some kind of interim solution in which they might accept far less than they are demanding in Paris. Even getting to this stage seems to depend, in their view, on concessions by the US. The resolution does not make clear how such concessions will come about, but it implies that they will result from further military pressure. Thus, enemy preparations now under way--such as the resumption of significant infiltration--may have been steps envisaged when the resolution was adopted last spring and summer. It could be, however, that Hanoi earlier this year expected the US to offer additional concessions, but is now convinced that this will only happen after increased military pressure.

5. Resolution 9 bears a relationship to political initiatives the Communists took last spring--the ten-point peace plan introduced at Paris in May and the "Provisional Revolutionary Government" (PRG) for the South proclaimed in June--but it differs from public Communist commentary on these moves in emphasis. The ten points, for example, offer a vague prescription for installing a coalition government in Saigon, but also hint at different stages and alternative ways of accommodating Communists' claims for a share of political power in the South. One point refers to a "period intervening between the restoration of peace and the holding of general elections when neither party

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shall impose its political regime on the people...." Resolution 9 suggests that this interim period may be of long duration.

6. This could indicate that the Communists may not be aiming--at least for the near term--at a final and precise political settlement in Paris with specific US guarantees. The issue of a coalition government is treated in the text and in briefing documents as a distant and ill-defined objective, whereas references to interim arrangements are described at length. One passage in the text of the resolution portrays the "new situation" as one in which there will be "two governments" and "two armed forces" contending for control of the population, a contingency also raised in the cadre study sessions. In the context of the resolution, this dual arrangement presupposes either an agreed or tacit cease-fire, but obviously one that does not rule out intimidation, terrorism, assassinations, and sabotage, which the Communists associate with "armed" political struggle. It also appears to assume a mutually acknowledged territorial division of the country between two armed camps.

7. In calling for a successful "winter-spring" campaign in 1969-70, Resolution 9 at times suggests that this would bring about the "new situation" in the near future. The campaign is to place particular stress on consolidating enemy bases in the rugged Cambodian border areas of northern III Corps and southern II Corps--Communist Military Regions 6 and 10--and on strengthening areas of Communist control in the Mekong Delta region. Special emphasis is also placed on developing local and guerrilla forces to "defend liberated areas" and "secret guerrillas" to operate in cities and in territory under the control of the Saigon government.

8. The overwhelming emphasis of the document is on the need to build up political or mass organizations and local administrative structures in preparation for the "new situation." This emphasis represents almost a 180-degree turnabout from the tone of the

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eighth Resolution issued by COSVN a year earlier. The eighth Resolution was weighted heavily on the side of military struggle and on the need to continue the "general offensive" begun with Tet 1968. The ninth Resolution, on the other hand, gives far more attention to the prerequisites for stepping up the political side of the struggle. It seems to assume that some sort of stand-down of large main force units will take place, and sometimes speaks directly of a cease-fire. The resolution leans heavily on the principles of armed political warfare and on the use of small-scale guerrilla and sapper action. In these ways, and in its references to concentrating on the "immediate task of obtaining a US withdrawal and on "step-by-step" progress, the resolution seems to reflect recommendations by North Vietnamese politburo member Truong Chinh in this policy speech of mid-1968.

9. Resolution 9 does not exude confidence. Although all indoctrination campaigns of this nature point up weak spots the party wants improved, the new resolution is unusually explicit in admitting extensive problems, particularly those of morale, among the Viet Cong leadership and in the ranks. Examples of the loss of popular support by the Communists have been reported increasingly by low-level ralliers and prisoners over the past year and Resolution 9 generally reflects such a trend. It further implies that there is a kind of credibility gap with regard to Communist claims to infallibility. The document admits to serious manpower problems, including increased desertions and defections over the past year, and frankly acknowledges extensive inroads by the Saigon regime into Communist areas through the pacification program.

10. The 9th Resolution may be intended rather than as a document of discouragement and defeat, to develop greater flexibility among cadres for pursuing the war in new forms. Although the Vietnamization program was only in the early stages of implementation when Resolution 9 was issued, the document does give the program some attention. These passages, like enemy propaganda, indicate that the Communists view Vietnamization as a device for protracting the war and permitting the US to leave in a "position of

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strength." The document clearly opts for a Communist course of applying sufficient military pressure to try to frustrate this objective and to force the US instead to depart sooner on terms agreed with the Communists. It may be that the "new situation" forecast in the document depends on the success or failure of this course, but it is equally likely that the Communist leadership is trying to prepare its cadres to face a number of contingencies, none promising early attainment of its political goals but holding out long-range opportunities for eventual victory if the cadre stay the course.

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